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The Dark Side of Alternative Asset Markets: Networks, Performance and Risk Taking  
 
Abstract  
When actors invest in making strong network ties (relationships) with other actors, such ties can 
potentially influence behavior and subsequent financial performance, but the strength and 
direction of these effects is debated.  Using original fine-grained data that documents the nature 
and extent of the relationships between Hedge Funds through their Prime Brokers (banks that 
provide leverage, issue credit lines and serve as bridges between Hedge Funds) we probe the 
social topology of Hedge Fund to Hedge Fund relationships that shapes this global alternative 
asset market. Contrasting much recent research that tends to stress the positive effects of network 
relationships, we find that investing in network relationships in this industry appears to have a 
“dark side” in terms of both performance and risk taking; where we probe various measures of 
both performance and risk in line with recent finance literature. We explore the reasons for these 
effects, and conclude that investing in Hedge Fund to Hedge Fund network ties can lead to 
inferior performance and increased risks that may not benefit the investor. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Building a network of relationships at either the personal or institution level is an investment 
decision that carries both downside risk and upside potential. In recent years the literature has 
increasingly recognized that financial markets have network dimensions; and until now 
researchers have explored some of the upside potential of these relationships. For example, 
Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) show that bulge-bracket investment banks benefit from use of their 
ties with institutional investors when pricing and distributing corporate securities before 
information about these assets becomes freely available; Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Li (2007) 
suggest those ties can improve the quality of deals that flow to venture capital firms, and can 
allow venture capitalists to pool correlated signals so as to achieve superior information 
possibilities; and Cohen and Frazzini (2010) explore why markets should look more closely at 
supplier-customer relationships to predict performance. The positive performance effects of 
networks in financial markets have also been noted in the management and sociology literatures: 
for instance, Uzzi (1999) shows that the costs of a firm’s capital varies positively with the degree 
to which its commercial transactions with a bank are embedded in social attachments, and 
Sorenson and Stuart (2001) show that better networked venture capitalists experience better 
performance1. 
However, the possibility that investments in networks might increase risk and have 
negative effects on performance is much less attended. Anticipating our study is the work of 
Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2008), who noted that when bankers sit on firms’ boards, such 
connections may lead firms to over-invest in projects and be more likely to engage in risky 
mergers. More robustly, Guedj and Barnea (2009), studying Fortune 1,500 companies, find that 
                                                        
1The connections discussed here are not the same as direct investment linkages caused by linking the asset 
side of one balance sheet to the liability sides of the counter‐party; see for instance the discussion of Allen and 
Babus, 2009.  
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greater network centrality of their directors can be associated with some negative performance 
effects for the firms involved, but they did not consider risk explicitly. In other contexts such as 
the movie industry, a few recent studies have suggested that ‘over-tight’ networks can create high 
costs due to ‘over-crowding’ and ‘cognitive dissonance’ effects, leading to inferior decision 
making (Ferriani, Cattani and Baden-Fuller, 2010). But until now there does not appear to have 
been any serious exploration of the possibility of increased risk and decreased performance when 
investing in network relationships in financial markets generally, and more particularly in 
alternative asset markets; by focusing on the Hedge Fund industry, this paper aims to address all 
of those deficiencies.  
Networks feature prominently in the Hedge Fund industry. Recent ethnographic evidence 
suggests that a Hedge Fund is seldom an entity that confronts a market ‘on its own’. More 
typically, it is part of a rich network of interpersonal and inter-organizational connections, through 
which support is channeled and information circulates, including research reports, news, prices, as 
well as information about the behavior of other market actors  (Beunza D.; I. Hardie and D. 
MacKenzie. 2006 Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007). Some of this flow is at the level of individuals 
who typically work for Hedge-Funds (see Simon, Millo, Kellard and Engel, 2010 and Figueiredo, 
Meyer and Rawley, 2010), but much of it passes through the firm to firm connections that are 
orchestrated by prime brokers. We know that almost all Hedge Funds rely on Prime Brokers to 
assist them executing their trades; but some choose to nurture the relationship with their Prime 
Brokers to gain information about what other Hedge Funds are doing in terms of trading 
(Danielsson, Taylor and Zigrand, 2005: 531; Simon et al. 2010). For example, it is not uncommon 
for a Prime Broker to pass information on whether a certain stock is being shorted by other Hedge 
Funds, and to what extent, without naming any particular fund.  In addition there is anecdotal 
evidence that Prime Brokers perform bridging between their clients; that is they inform some of 
their Hedge Fund clients about selective trades made by others knowing that this information 
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could be a source of competitive advantage. This is vividly illustrated by the comments of one of 
the Prime Broker managers we interviewed for this research: 
“We at …. have a large desk dealing with Hedge Funds”. I talk to all my clients 
every day, asking them what they are doing and answering their questions. Of 
course I do not know (everything about) what they are doing, but the questions 
they ask are very revealing. Such as “how do we do this particular trade for this 
stock”. And when several people ask the same question in the same day, then one 
has a sense that things are happening” .. “yes of course we have Chinese walls, 
but I agree some information inevitably leaks.” (interview evidence from prime 
broker manager, 2009). 
 
Not all Hedge Fund managers believe that this Hedge Fund to Hedge Fund information circulation 
adds value. Just as Griffin, Shu and Topaloglu (2010) showed that “market information” on 
corporate announcements are not perceived to add value by all participants, when they examined 
detailed trading data for the NASDAQ over a 6 year period; so too in this alternative asset market, 
some Hedge Fund managers caution against valuing the gossip about other Hedge Fund activity 
that comes from talking to prime brokers: 
“Prime brokers carry gossip and the value of this is often over-estimated. Their 
information can tell you about the herd, but such information is typically too late and 
unreliable. Sorting out the good gossip from the bad takes a lot of time and effort. We here 
(in our Hedge Fund) undertake original modeling and research, we believe we make 
market trends not follow them, and our performance outcomes are superior giving force to 
our beliefs...” (interview evidence from owner-manager of Hedge Fund, 2010) 
 
In summary, some Hedge Funds have chosen their Prime Brokers to make connections with other 
Hedge Funds (and a few may choose multiple well-connected Prime Brokers such as Goldman 
Sachs, UBS, Bear Stearns or Morgan Stanley each with several hundred Hedge Funds in their 
direct network - to maximize this exposure); where as some Hedge Funds may deliberately choose 
Prime Brokers that have few connections (such as JP Morgan or Barclay Capital or Fidelity with 
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less than 50 Hedge Funds in their direct network)2. Critically for our study, the choice of which 
Prime Broker to use is always viewed as being crucial for the Hedge Fund, and almost always this 
decision is made when the Hedge Fund is first formed; and once taken this decision is rarely 
changed (at least before the financial crisis of 2007)3. This means that any analysis of the 
relationship between Hedge Fund network connectivity and Hedge Fund risk taking and 
performance is unlikely to suffer from ‘reverse causality’, because the connectivity was known 
and set at the moment of the Hedge Fund formation.   
 
To explore the effect of these “network choices” on the risk behavior of Fund managers 
and Fund performance we selected a sample of more than 2,000 active Hedge Funds listed in the 
TASS database for the period up to 2006; a period of relative tranquility in financial markets. The 
Tass data base is the only reliable data base that contains data on both Hedge Fund performance 
and Hedge Fund connectivity. Noting the fact that Hedge Funds do not form direct links with 
other Hedge Funds, we mapped the connections among Hedge Funds that exist on account of 
Prime Brokerage connections. Figure One shows a partial view of these connections; and it can be 
seen that some Hedge Funds are not well connected with other Hedge Funds, where as some are 
very well connected because their Prime Brokers have many links; and that some Hedge Funds 
(7% of the sample) choose to be connected to more than one prime broker and these typically 
have an even more extended set of direct and indirect connections. This crude picture is 
illustrative; our analysis uses well established, sophisticated measures for capturing network 
centrality (including the eigenvalue, closeness and betweenness measures).  
Figure One about Here 
In our work, we measure the risk taking and the performance for each Fund in our sample; 
we utilize the last 5 years of monthly returns data provided by Tass4. Taking into account some of 
                                                        
2 Since 2007, several Hedge Funds have started to consider multiple prime brokers is to alleviate counter‐party 
risk. 
3 According to industry sources; and Justin Miller, expert on Hedge Funds, has undertaken a longitudinal 
analysis of Prime Broker connections and orally confirms this fact.   
4 Where a fund has been in existence for less than 5 years but more than one, we also include it in our dataset, 
as we will explain below.  
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the most recent developments in Hedge Fund Industry measurement approaches particularly as 
they relate to risk (e.g. Bollen and Whaley, 2009; Patton, 2009) we then estimated a robust (to 
outliers) linear regression model where the dependent variables were: performance (absolute 
returns), performance adjusted for risk (Sharpe and Sortino), and risk taking behavior ( negative 
skew and positive kurtosis; market risk exposure; and market risk exposure on the downside), and 
the independent variable – network centrality along with appropriate controls.  
Summarizing our results we found that network centrality measures had a negative and 
statistically significant influence on all three major measures of Hedge Fund performance, and a 
positive and statistically significant impact on all three major measures of risk taking. In the paper 
we explore the possible meanings of our results and explain our very extensive robustness tests 
that extended our measurement set of performance, risk taking and centrality measures.  
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we show that the relationship 
structure of the Hedge Fund industry has an important influence on Fund risk taking and Fund 
performance, which suggests that for a better understanding of the industry, future studies of 
Hedge Fund behavior need to take account of this dimension. In this respect, our findings give 
support to the claims of Abolafia (1997) and Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) on the need to include 
sociological variables to finance studies. Second, our results advance a better appreciation that 
investing in network relationships can have a “dark side” (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000): Networks 
have costs as well as benefits and it is not obvious whether one side always offsets the other.  
Third, our analysis suggests that rearchers should examine risk taking dynamics when they look at 
performance effects; risk taking is a variable largely disregarded in prior studies of network 
effects.  
In the following sections we briefly review the contrasting lines of argument concerning 
the performance-related consequences of network centrality. We begin with findings suggesting 
that networking is beneficial to Hedge Fund performance, and next turn to research highlighting 
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the downsides of networks. We continue by discussing the relationship between network 
centrality and risk. We then describe data, measurement strategy and present the results. We 
conclude by highlighting the implications of the findings, their limitations and topics for future 
research. 
 
Theory-Context  
We combine the rich research tradition on the role of social networks in economics with the 
extensive finance literature on risk-taking and performance in Hedge Funds to explore novel links 
between risk-taking and performance. We focus on the hedge fund industry for both theoretical 
and substantive reasons. In theory terms, this is an important industry for studying risk taking 
behavior, because most of its actors claim their skills and expertise give them a deep 
understanding of the drivers of risk that allows them to divorce risk from return: in short, they 
claim to have the highly prized answer to the ‘search for absolute returns’. In terms of substance, 
Fung and Hsieh (1999) have deepened our understanding of this issue by exploring the limited 
extent to which Hedge Funds actually succeed in gaining ‘absolute returns’ rather than merely 
tracking the overall market, and paved the way for many others to explore particular this and other 
dimensions fund behavior and performance (e.g. Brown, Goetzmann and Park, 2001; Fung, Hsieh, 
Naik and Ramadorai, 2009). One of the most important recent contributions comes from Patton 
(2009) who carefully unpicked the meaning of risk in the risk-return metrics. He noted that the 
sophisticated investor does not mind risk on the upside, but is averse to down-side risk, especially 
when it is correlated with market down-turns. Patton developed and refined risk measures for 
Hedge Funds; and using these metrics he noted that only a few hedge fund managers were able to 
avoid risk. His results confirm that the hedge fund industry is a ripe site for investigating what 
factors make for better or worse risk-return, and we use some of his measures in this paper 
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Theory-The upside of centrality 
The network literature proffers a well developed body of published work that provides robust 
theoretical and empirical approaches to support the intuitive idea that connections between actors 
involved in an industry will lead to advantages (including the management of risk). We begin our 
theory section by revisiting these arguments about the positive effect of networks on performance, 
although only – since the arguments are both well known and intuitively clear - summarizing the 
more important themes which have a long antecedence in the literature. The argument goes like 
this: direct ties - as well as their indirect ‘ties-of-ties’ - shape information flows (Uzzi, 1996): 
direct ties potentially yielding many benefits including knowledge sharing and complementarities 
(Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Ahuja, 2000, Sorenson 
and Stuart, 2001), while indirect ties can also represent channels for communication, transferring 
information and facilitating knowledge exchange (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Writers such as 
Podolny (1994) and Gulati (1995 and 1998) have explained how actors (firms) benefit both from 
favorable network positions as well as from the resources they can access from their alters. 
Through their direct and indirect partners, firms can get access to the knowledge and experience 
that come from their interactions with their partners. Hence the access to information, resources, 
knowledge, contacts, and so on can vary according to the firms heterogeneous positions in their 
networks and - to the degree that better access to fine-grained information and resources facilitates 
superior knowledge exchange and generates greater awareness of available opportunities - 
differences in network position can at least partly explain the better performance of some actors.  
When we apply these traditional ideas to our chosen industry, we can hypothesize that 
Hedge Funds that occupy central positions within their social structures are likely to see 
performance benefits. Centrality allows the Hedge Funds access to flows of information that 
circulate selectively within their networks, thus enhancing their ability to tap resources and 
contacts dispersed in the field, resulting in higher performance. 
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Hypothesis 1A (White side of networks): For a given level of risk-taking, the performance 
of Hedge Funds will be better when they are more centrally connected 
 
To finish with the positive considerations, we need to examine risk-taking. The literature 
on an individual’s risk taking behavior is extensive, but generally focused on psychological 
factors (e.g. Kowenburg and Ziemba, 2007). Here we are concerned with a positional explanation 
of the phenomenon for firms, and we begin with the premise that behavioral phenomena, such as 
risk taking, are driven in large part by the opportunities linked to a firm’s position in its external 
environment (Burt, 1982; Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 1993). A firm that has a more central 
position in the network of actors should have better access to information and so be able to avoid 
risks more easily. In contrast, those on the periphery not only face informational difficulties in 
assessing risks, but (if their performance is poor) may face strong incentives to engage in risk 
taking (Bromiley 1991). This logic of the powerless - where those on the periphery have less to 
lose by taking risks - would also appear to be consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979), which states that being in the ‘domain of losses’ produces risk-seeking behavior. 
If the lack of power puts actors in the domain of losses, and possessing power puts actors into the 
domain of gains, then we can hypothesize that power has a negative relationship with risk taking. 
Such arguments can easily be seen as potentially relevant to the context where being close to other 
Hedge Funds can give better information about risks  
Hypothesis 2a (White side of networks): Hedge funds that are more centrally located can 
achieve a given level of return with lower risk taking on account of superior information. 
Hypotheses 1a and 2a can be explained mathematically as follows: if ሺߨ, ߪሻ represent the 
return and variance of the fund respectively, and N the measure of the closeness of the fund to the 
centre of the network, then H1a and H2a mean that: 
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߲ሺߨሻ
߲ܰ ൐ 0 ܽ݊݀
߲ሺߪሻ
߲ܰ ൏ 0 
 
Theory - The downside of centrality  
Whilst the positive dynamics of network centrality are well known, the negative dynamics have 
been less commonly explored. Fracassi and Tate (2010) explore the network effects of CEOs and 
Boards of Directors in a study of S&P 1,500 companies, and find that CEO-Director ties can 
reduce firm value, which lends further support to Guner, Melmendier and Tate’s (2008) novel 
results that direct connections with experts do not always yield valuable information. And there 
may be other factors at work: maintaining an increasing number of relationships implies the 
higher coordination costs of the greater time and energy needed to managing these relationships; 
and it is plausible to assume that the costs incurred in negotiating and monitoring increasing 
numbers of relationships will eventually outweigh their information benefits (Ferriani, Cattani and 
Baden-Fuller, 2009). What may be true for individuals; may also be true for firms. The time, 
effort and attention required in managing both direct and indirect relationships may starve 
activities that have more value for the firm (McFayden and Cannella 2004), again meaning that 
too many relationships make additional benefits from shared experience difficult to attain 
(Berman, Down and Hill, 2002). Put in the context of the Hedge Fund industry, having more 
social relationships with other Hedge Funds may not be cost-efficient in certain situations or at 
certain levels (Adler and Kwon, 2002).  
Second, cognitive research points to the dysfunctional behavior that can arise from 
overexposure to information (Simon, 1971; McFadyen and Cannella, 2004; Sutcliffe and Weick, 
2007). There are opportunity costs of inspecting each alternative opportunity, so increasing the 
number can cause information overload and lead to dysfunctional behavior such as lack of 
perspective, difficulty in selecting relevant information, and unproductive scrutiny of new ideas or 
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knowledge (Schwartz, 2004). Schneider (1987) demonstrates that when economic actors 
(individuals or organizations) are overloaded, primary and secondary symptoms become manifest: 
the former including a lack of perspective and inability to select out irrelevant information, 
leading to cognitive strain that adversely affects the timeliness and quality of decisions (Eppler 
and Mengis, 2004), while secondary symptoms include reduced scanning ability, narrowed 
attention, and a desire for increased control. Together they compound both the mental effort and 
the time required to make sense of the information, exacerbating those problems the actors 
(individuals or firms) are trying to solve (Sutcliffe and Weick, 2007). This speculation is 
consistent with theorizing by Hansen, Poldolny and Pfeffer (2001) who suggest that large 
networks might prove counter-productive as they compound the problem of assimilating diverse 
suggestions, solutions and ideas, which is also consistent with Ferriani et al.’s (2009) findings (in 
studying the Hollywood film industry) that despite the informational benefits of centrality, project 
entrepreneurs can suffer downsides arising from overexposure. Project entrepreneurs are also 
limited in their ability to take full advantage of such positions, if faced with the added complexity 
of managing and monitoring a large network.  
When these ideas are put in the context of Hedge Funds that have strong connections with 
other Hedge Funds, we can speculate that, far from simplifying the problem of how to analyze 
market information, centrality may amplify the amount information their managers have to 
assimilate, causing negative effects.  
Hypothesis 1b (Dark Side): Hedge Funds that are more central to the industry will exhibit 
inferior returns for a given risk profile 
Just as being centrally connected in a network of ties can lower returns, it can also promote 
perverse risk taking effects. Inefficient information processing in overly connected networks may 
not just cause poor decisions to be made, but may make risky decisions appear to be safe. Guner 
et al. (2008) explain how connections can also bring biased and misleading information, which 
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may be inadequately sorted and screened. Both these factors suggest that Hedge Funds that are 
more central may engage in unnecessary risk taking, and the management literature reinforces 
these arguments. Being central in a network may give rise to feelings of power (even for an 
organization), and that power can have negative effects. According to Anderson and Galisnky 
(2006), for instance, possessing power leads actors (that could include firms) to pay more 
attention to the positive potential payoffs inherent in risky actions and devote less to the potential 
dangers, since power makes people (or organizations) suppresses their behavioral inhibition 
system and give more credence to reward-laden information. This focusing on rewards and being 
less aware of dangers is clearly likely to be associated with risky behavior that ignores the 
negative potential consequences).  
We amplify the point by referring back to individual behaviors, and speculating that these may be 
relevant for firms. It is argued that powerful individuals would be more likely to engage in 
gambling because they would be more focused on the money they could win, and less on the 
possibility of losing the bet. Furthermore, power might also lead actors to be more optimistic of 
their chances of winning, and also in their estimates of risk, since power induces a reduction in the 
perceived probability of experiencing the downside of risk. The accumulated rewards associated 
with past successes can also lead to over-optimism and risky behavior. In the stock market arena, 
previous capital gains have been shown to increase investors’ optimism and risk-taking, and 
previous market losses to increase their risk aversion, by exacerbating their fear of incurring 
further losses (Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 2001). Finally, power can increase the propensity to 
take risks by leading actors to be over-confident in their abilities to capture the upside of risk or to 
deal with negative consequences should their risky behavior fail to pay off. Whilst all these last 
arguments related to individuals, we suggest that they may also be relevant for firms. To illustrate 
this point, consider that Julian Robertson and his prominent Tiger hedge fund was openly 
criticized by Business Week on April 1, 1996 for excessive risk taking. Yet these comments 
appear to have been ignored for Tiger fund continued to woo investors and although it reached a 
peak value of around $22 billion in 1998, a series of high risk moves (that some have argued was 
the continuation of what was long evidenced by past behavior) caused the value of these funds to 
collapse, and Robertson closed his funds in 2000. One would think that Robertson with his 
connections would have heeded the warnings and not have needed to take unnecessary risks. But 
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this does not appear to be the case. And one might also think that, after the collapse of the Tiger 
funds, the actors in the market would wish to avoid Robertson and those associated with him, to 
punish him for making those mistakes. But subsequent to these events several of the managers 
who worked with Robertson in his fund (and so associated with the risk taking) went on to form 
their own companies, typically labeled as the Tiger Cubs; and paradoxically they found strong 
support from many parts of the finance community. The suggestion of commentators is that 
because Robertson was so central to the industry, that centrality continued to hold sway, and these 
Tiger Cubs used the connections they made with influential actors when working for Robertson, 
to overcome the Robertson opprobrium and obtain valuable resources in their subsequent careers.  
Thus, since centrality increases power and insofar as perception of power accentuates risk-
taking behavior, we should observe an increase in risk taking behaviour for those hedge funds that 
move towards more central positions. 
 
Hypothesis 2b (Dark Side): Hedge Funds that are more central to the network will take 
more risks than those located on the periphery. 
Going back to our mathematical notation, we can portray hypotheses 1b and 2b as follows: 
߲ሺߨሻ
߲ܰ ൏ 0 ܽ݊݀
߲ሺߪሻ
߲ܰ ൐ 0 
 
Visualizing the results 
We can visualize our ‘dark side’ predictions against the ‘white side’ using the traditional risk-
return map shown as Figure 2 below, where the X axis represents risk taking and the Y axis 
returns, and the heavy line indicates the usual optimal portfolio trade-off of risk and return. The 
points to the North and West represent areas where increases in centrality yield superior returns 
and the possibility of less risk taking (for a given return); whereas the South and East portrays the 
area where centrality in the network has negative effects on returns and risk-taking. The figure can 
be thought of as a graphical representation of different scenarios of what happens when an actor 
starts with a market based portfolio and uses its network connections to shift position, above the 
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line representing positive network effects and below the line representing negative network 
effects.  
Insert Figure 2 Near Here - 
 
2. Data and Methods 
2.1. Setting and sample 
Although dating from the 1940s, Hedge Funds developed into their current form in the late 80s 
since when their number has increased dramatically from a few hundred in the early 1980s to a 
peak of about 11,000 in 2007-8. They have become significant actors in global capital markets, 
with paid-in capital peaking in mid-2008 at approximately $1.9 trillion (Hedge Fund Research 
Inc, HFR, 2008). This study used the 2006 TASS database, which is well known to industry 
experts who generally consider it as very representative of the industry (Miller, 2009; Fung and 
Hsieh, 1999)5. It contains data about 4,158  Hedge Funds operating all over the world, and is the 
only generally available dataset that contains a reliable measure of prime-broker hedge-fund 
connections (Miller, 2009). To calculate our connectivity measures, we eliminated those funds 
that did not state whether they had a prime broker (perhaps because they lacked a formal prime 
broker relationship) or who listed as their prime broker an institution that did not appear to be part 
of the investment banking community (in technical network parlance, this meant we eliminated 
funds that were not part of the ‘main component’), thus reducing our dataset to 3,435 funds with 
25 prime brokers; that individually had a wide variation in number of Hedge Fund customers: in 
particular, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, and UBS each had more than 300 
Fund connections, whereas at the other extreme Fidelity, AIG, ING, and Prudential had fewer 
                                                        
5 According to Miller: The largest industry data base as of 2007 was HFR with about 44% coverage of the 
industry, the next largest data base is TASS with 33% coverage and the third largest is CISDM (formerly MARS) 
with 23% coverage; and there is some overlap between the data‐bases. 
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than 20 direct  connections6. In our actual estimations, on account of missing data, we had to 
further reduce our data set to 2,116 funds with on average 40 monthly observations for each fund7. 
The year 2006 was deliberately chosen as representing a period of relative stability in markets, 
where concepts of risk were not ‘stretched’ by outside events.  
 
2.3 Variable and measures 
Dependent variables 
Our dependent variables are performance and risk-taking using the monthly valuation data in the 
five year window from 2001 to 2006. Where a fund has been in existence for less than 5 years but 
more than one year, we also include it into our analysis. Regarding the measures of performance, 
we define and report results for the absolute return and for the standard Sharpe and Sortino 
measures, the later being the two most commonly used in the financial literature. We note that 
Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) show how adding further, different performance cross-sectional 
measures does not change the rankings of different funds: and we too checked our data and found 
similar results - that adding more measures does not add more information.  
As far as risk-taking is concerned, we utilize Patton’s (2009) suggestions, which build on 
earlier work on Hedge Funds. This means that for the second, third, and fourth moment of the 
distribution of the funds’ returns we adopt measures that look to down-side risks, and the extent to 
which they are correlated (or are uncorrelated) with market risks. To identify the market risk, we 
follow again Patton in using the MSCI World Market Index (Source: Datastream). We explain 
everything in more detail below.  
 
                                                        
6 In computing the network statistics, where a fund manager had two funds one in euro and one in US dollars, 
the network data were computed as if this were one fund in line; doing the computation the other way would 
make no difference, as centrality measures are all normalized in our estimation procedures.  Note also, in 2006 
Bear Stearns was independent of JP Morgan. 
7 The most common missing data was fund size, an important control variable; we undertook robustness 
checks on the missing observations.  
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Performance Measures: Absolute Return, Sharpe, and Sortino  
Our first measure is the absolute return of the fund without regard to risk. Our other two reported 
measures take account of risk: the second measure examines risk adjusted performance using the 
Sharpe Ratio, developed by Nobel prize laureate William F. Sharpe, which is widely used in the 
Hedge Funds industry and is defined as: 
 Sharpe Ratio௜ ൌ
∑ ሺೝ೟,೔షೝ೟,೑ሻ೅೟సభ
೅
஢  
where rt,i identifies the monthly return series for the individual hedge fund i at month t; rf the 
monthly risk free rate at month t; and σ the standard deviation of the excess return series (and we 
use the yield on US Treasury bonds as proxy of the risk  free rate).  
As the Sharpe Ratio is based on strong assumptions about the underlining return 
generating process, we also employ as our third measure the Sortino Ratio. In fact, it is well 
known that the wide use of derivative instruments in the hedge fund industry generates both 
asymmetric return distributions and ‘fat tails’ (see among others Geman and Kharoubi, 2003), and 
we compute the Sortino Ratio (developed by Frank A. Sortino) that deals with negative and 
positive returns differently when computing volatility (standard deviation). Its definition is: 
 Sortino Ratio௜ ൌ
∑ ቀೝ೟,೔షೝ೟,೑ቁ೅೟సభ
೅
஢כ  
Comparing the Sortino and Sharpe Ratios, the only difference is the divisor - σ* -which in 
the Sortino case refers to the standard deviation of the ‘only negative’ returns. It follows that this 
formula emphasizes the highest negative rather than highest positive returns to compute volatility, 
reflecting the stance of the risk-averse investor.  
We further checked the robustness of our results using other performance measures 
including: the Omega ratio, the Calmar ratio, the excess return on the Conditional Value at Risk, 
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and the excess return on the Modified Value at Risk using the Cornish-Fisher expansion. As noted 
above, like Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) we found that all ratios give similar results, so are 
again not reported here (although they are available on request). 
 
Risk Measures: Skew, Kurtosis, and Co-movements with Market Indices 
Most hedge fund managers claim that they look to avoid risk by utilizing complex trading 
strategies; yet they are unable to achieve high returns without taking some risks (such as the risk 
that the market will not price the assets correctly in line with their judgments, even in the longer 
term, as explained by Beunza and Stark, 2004). In line with previous work, when estimating risk 
we employ several measures, taking at first the main moments of the distribution of hedge fund 
returns, such as standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. Standard deviation is a well known 
measure that places equal weight to upside and downside risks; in contrast skewness measures the 
extent of asymmetry between the two, while the kurtosis gives the extent to which the returns 
feature ‘fat tails’.8 Putting this in context means that a hedge fund which shows both negative 
skewness (more left tails) and high kurtosis (fat tails - leptokurtosis) is considered more 
unattractive than a normally distributed return by a risk averse investor. To control for the risk-
averse investor we employ a logit model using a dummy variable that equals one where a fund 
presents both negative skewness and positive kurtosis and zero otherwise.  
Thus far, our risk taking measures are rather simple, and consider risk from the perspective 
of the investor that is not diversified. The reality for the sophisticated investors who deal in Hedge 
Funds is different; they have other ways to combat risk that involve market portfolios. To 
overcome this potential limitation, we need to consider risk in terms of co-movement respect to 
                                                        
8 In lay person terms, a fat tailed distribution has extreme events occuring more frequently than implied by the 
‘normal’ distribution.  
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the market index, so, moving from a concept of idiosyncratic risk to a systematic one.9 Few 
researchers have taken this approach until recently for both conceptual and technical reasons, due 
partly to the non-linearity of Hedge Funds returns. However Patton (2009) has explained how to 
resolve this challenge. Our second measure of risk is risk matched to market movements (Patton, 
2009). For those who unacquainted with his approach, we explain that computationally the first 
step is to find the correlation between the portfolio return and the market return, and we estimate 
(for each fund) a polynomial approximation to the conditional function-polynomial regression, as 
follows: 
rt,i =∑ஶ௡ୀ଴ βn (rt,MSCI) n + ε. 
where rt,i and rt,MSCI are the returns of the hedge fund i and the MSCI World Index, respectively, at 
time t. Whilst theoretically one should consider all moments of the equation, we consider only the 
first and second order terms as we found little significance to the higher orders, so this paper 
reports the results (for each fund) of the following model: 
rt,i = β0 + β1rt,MSCI+ β2rt,MSCI 2 + ε . 
We then test the ‘neutrality’(to the risk) of each hedge fund to the market index by testing 
the null hypothesis that β1 and β2 both equal zero and use the p-value of the test (Wald test) as a 
primary proxy of the systematic hedge fund risk exposure to the market. Here, a low p-value 
indicates that the fund is not ‘neutral’ to the main source(s) of market risk, and translates into a 
signal that the fund is suffering from high systematic risk exposure. 
Our third approach recognizes that some (but not all) investors such as the pension funds 
are quite risk averse. These risk-averse investors are concerned with the potentially asymmetric 
preference of investors to the co-movement of the fund to the market index (see Patton, 2009). 
Again, considering only the second order of the polynomial MacLaurin expansion, we run a 
                                                        
9 Systematic risk, sometimes called market risk, aggregate risk, or undiversifiable risk, is the risk associated with 
aggregate market returns. By contrast, unsystematic risk, sometimes called specific risk, idiosyncratic risk, residual 
risk, or diversifiable risk, is the specific risk in a portfolio, which is uncorrelated with aggregate market returns.  
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second battery of regressions that take the following form 
rt,i = γ0 + γ1,neg rt,MSCIδ+ γ2,negrt,MSCI 2δ+ γ1,pos rt,MSCI(1-δ) + γ2,posrt,MSCI2 (1-δ) ε . 
where δ is a dummy variable that equals one whether the return of the MSCI World Index (rt,MSCI) 
at time t is less than zero, and zero otherwise. In our equation, γ 1,neg and γ2,neg capture the co-
movement of the hedge fund with the market risk conditionally to negative returns of the market 
index, while γ 1,pos and γ2,pos capture the co-movement of the hedge fund to the market risk 
conditionally to positive returns of the market index. To compute the “neutrality on the 
downside” (Patton, 2009) we test whether the first derivative of the equation is not positive when 
the market is negative - in other words: 
 డ൫௥೔,೟൯డ൫௥ಾೄ಴಺,೟൯ ൌ γ 1,neg + 2 γ 2,neg(rt,MSCI| rt,MSCI≤ 0) 
As before, we use the Wald test to examine if the equation is not just different from zero, 
but also that it is positive. Consequently, a low p-value of the test indicates neutrality (to the risk) 
of the hedge fund on the downside. For instance, a p-value below 10 percent means a rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the hedge fund is positively affected by the market when the latter is 
negative: this being a situation where the hedge fund’s return does not follow the market going 
down, something potentially attractive to sophisticated risk averse investors. 
 
Network variables 
The Hedge Fund industry has a sparsely connected structure, since Funds are not formally linked 
with others, except via the intermediary of the prime brokers. (In this respect, this industry is quite 
unlike many others, where many firms have formal alliances with competitors to collaborate on 
specific issues). Investigation of the data reveals that 93% of Hedge Funds are connected to only 
one prime broker, and it is the few funds (7% of total) with multiple prime brokers that makes the 
connections between the groups. As Figure 1 showed, the network structure of the industry is 
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characterized by the presence of a main component (where funds are connected either directly or 
distantly) plus a few isolated funds, typically smaller specialist funds perhaps having no prime 
broker or being connected to only a few others using an unconnected investment bank10. In our 
network analysis we remove these isolates and analyze only those funds in the main component of 
this large network11.  
We utilize four standard measures to capture the centrality of the fund in the network, 
explained below, and their differences visually illustrated in Figure 3.  
Insert Figure 3 Near Here 
The first such measure is Degree centrality which is the simplest because it just counts the 
number of connections of an actor-firm, stressing the local viewpoint. (Technically it measures 
‘transaction activity’ or ‘capacity’ of each actor of a given network.) The second network 
centrality measure is betweenness centrality; this measures the capacity of the paths or geodesics 
(i.e. minimal length paths) that connect a focal point to two other points in the network. Hedge 
Funds that occur on many shortest paths between other Hedge Funds have higher betweenness, 
and are hypothesized to be the most able to control flows of communication across the whole 
network, which depends on their relationships with all members of the network, and not 
necessarily on their number of direct connections. But a high betweenness score is not the same as 
being well connected, as Figure 3 illustrates. 
The third centrality measure is closeness centrality, which is defined as the mean geodesic 
distance (i.e. the shortest path) between a hedge fund and all other Hedge Funds reachable from it. 
Funds that are closer to all network members are seen as more central. This measure is often used 
to show that, as an actor’s (i.e. hedge fund) closeness to others increases, so does its access to 
                                                        
10 The main component is the largest connected cluster in the network. It eliminates isolates and small 
disconnected clusters. In substantive terms, the main component is the largest subset of organizations that can 
reach each other through indirect paths of finite length. The percentage of organizations connected to the main 
component is close to 90%.  
11 Most network measures are based on the main component, which is a connected graph for which measures 
can be generated. 
 The Dark Side of Alternative Asset Markets   (HFv08:08 March 2011)       For Discussion  
 
22
information (Leavitt, 1951), power (Coleman, 1973), prestige (Burt, 1982), and influence 
(Bavelas, 1950; and Friedkin 1991). It follows that those hedge funds closest to others are also 
nearest to sources of information, power, prestige or influence (Degenne and Forse’, 1994).  
All the centrality measures so far presented evaluate the centrality of the actor-fund 
without regard for the centrality of the actors to whom they are connected. But we need a 
distinction between an outlying local centre and a core centre, because being the centre of a group 
of relatively isolated funds is very different from being the centre of a set of highly integrated 
funds. So our fourth measure, the Eigenvector centrality assigns relative scores to all Hedge 
Funds in the network based on the principle that connections to high-scoring nodes (i.e., here, 
prime brokers connected to many Hedge Funds) contribute more to the score of the node in 
question than connections to low-scoring nodes. Bonacich (1972) asserts this index is particularly 
well suited to gauge an actor’s power.  
Once again, we stress that the different network measures try to capture the position of the 
actor in the network in different ways, and whilst they are generally correlated, they do not always 
move together as we pass through the data set. Theory does not say whether one measure is 
superior to the others; rather each has a slightly different role, measuring slightly different 
dimensions of the concept of network centrality: degree and betweenness emphasize direct 
connections whereas closeness and eigenvector centrality give more weight to indirect 
connections.  
 
2.4 Specifications 
Our two sets of dependent variables are the performance and the risk taking behavior of the hedge 
funds, and our cross-section equation specification takes the following form:  
Performance = Φi (Network features) + Σ γy (dummy strategy) 
+ γ1 (Ln(Age)) + γ2 (Ln(Asset Under Management)   
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Risk = Φi (Network features) + Σ γy (dummy strategy) 
+ γ1 (Ln(Age)) + γ2 (Ln(Asset Under Management)   
 
where Φi is a vector of the i-coefficients of the variables of theoretical interest (betweenness 
centrality, closeness centrality, eigenvalue), and γs are the coefficients of control variables. In 
these models, we control for the hedge fund’s investment style (as defined by Fung and Hseigh, 
1999, and used by all other analysts of Hedge Funds) using the coefficients γy; and standard errors 
are computed using Huber-White sandwich estimators making the statistical tests on the 
parameters robust to outliers. In line with previous research (see for instance Fung and Hsieh, 
1999; Titman and Tiu, 2010), we control for other Hedge Funds characteristics that may affect 
funds’ performance and the shape of their return distributions. We use Age and Assets under 
Management as a proxy of the longevity and size of the fund, respectively: and because of their 
strong positive asymmetric distributions, we use the natural logarithms of the variables.  
 
3. Results  
Before we explore the network effects on risk and performance, we stress tested our data set to 
ascertain the nature of risk taking and returns in our industry sample. Our results highlight how 
risk taking in Hedge Funds differs from that of regular index investing; those knowledgeable of 
this aspect of the industry may wish to skip this section, as it will not surprise Hedge Fund 
industry experts.  
 
Risk Management by Hedge Funds 
As the first row of Table 1 shows, the median hedge fund was less profitable than the World 
Market Index (MSCI World) throughout the period under investigation, In fact, while the funds 
have shown a monthly median return of 0.8 percent, which translates into a median yearly 
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continuously compound return of 10 percent, the MSCI World’s slightly higher 0.88 percent 
monthly median return translates into a yearly continuously compound median return of 11.13 
percent. However, the lower median return seems to be correlated to the lower risk of the median 
fund measured by its volatility (standard deviation), skewness and kurtosis. In fact, Table 1 shows 
that returns for the median hedge fund are less volatile, less right-tailed, and less fat-tailed than 
the market index over the sample time window. This evidence is corroborated by the fact that the 
market index shows a wider returns gap, recording both the smallest (minus 11 percent) and the 
highest (8.23 percent) monthly returns. Not surprisingly, the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality, 
reported in the last rows of Table 1, rejects the hypotheses of normal distribution for the MSCI 
World Index monthly return distributions. We can conclude, therefore, that over our study period, 
Hedge Funds delivered lower performance (returns) because of their implementation of risk-
averse strategies. 
Insert Table 1 near here 
Hedge funds follow many different strategies, and we categorize funds by investment style 
and give summary statistics for each strategy of the variables used in the multivariate analysis 
(Table 2). In the top part of the table, we report in the last two columns the statistical tests that 
indicate a statistically significant difference for all moments of the return distributions among 
investment style using both a parametric test (F-test) and a non-parametric one (χ2-test). As 
expected, all but two of the styles have heavy tailed distributions (kurtosis greater than 3). 
However, negative skewness seems not to have been widespread during the study period, as 
evidenced by the fact that the median maximum for all styles is greater than (the absolute value) 
of the median minimum. (Further probing of the data reveals that only the Event Driven style 
funds have a distribution that approximates the normal distribution of returns, and then only just at 
the 10 percent level, as shown by the normality statistic and the corresponding p-value of the 
Shapiro-Wilk test reported in Table 2.) 
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Insert Table 2 near here 
The middle part of Table 2 probes the nature of the returns more deeply and explores the 
extent to which the funds associated with different strategies are exposed to systemic factors. First 
of all, we report the median linear correlation of the funds and the market index ρ(ri;rMSCI). This 
term is negative (as expected) for the two styles labeled Dedicated Short Bias and Managed 
Futures; and it is approximately zero for Equity Market Neutral and Fixed Income Arb(itrage) 
strategies (again as expected). On the other hand, as many other writers have noted, the highest 
correlation between the median fund and the market index is detected for the ‘Fund of Funds’ and 
Long-Short Equity styles, which between them represent the largest part of the Hedge Fund 
industry by both number and size of funds.  
The coefficients β1 and β2 show the causal relationship of the funds with the MSCI market 
index: and thus constitute measures of systematic risk. The Wald test rejects (at the 10% level) the 
null hypothesis that β1 and β2 are conjointly different from zero for 9 styles out of 11, a result that 
suggests that funds are correlated with the market index. Again, only the median Equity Market 
Neutral and the Fixed Income Arb(itrage) funds are risk neutral to the market. As direct 
consequence, the percentage of non-neutral Hedge Funds in each style follows the same pattern. 
Our findings are quite similar to those of Patton (2009) and others, who note that a large 
percentage of funds in each style category are non-neutral to the market.  
The bottom part of table two probes other dimensions of returns, and focuses on whether 
the funds achieve downside market neutrality, as discussed by Patton (2009) and elaborated 
above. We report the conditional sign of the market index returns and test for the positive sign of 
the first derivatives, and find that only the Dedicated Short Bias and Managed Futures funds pass 
the test (at least at the 10 percent statistical level). Put technically, they are (in median) 
statistically significant in rejecting the null hypothesis of neutrality conditionally to a non-positive 
market movement, and so should be preferred by risk-averse investors in economy downturn as 
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they tend to move in the opposite direction to the market. As noted in our discussion above, this 
concept of neutrality is much more stringent than the more traditional metrics; and like Patton we 
find that most funds perform badly on this test. In particular, 77% of the Equity Market Neutral 
funds - that by definition should be neutral to downside market moves - failed this test. Looking at 
the last two columns of Table 2, which report the parametric and the non-parametric tests, we 
conclude there is a great dispersion among style classes for the neutrality on the downside. 
As far as our indicators of risk-adjusted performance -the Sharpe and Sortino ratios - we 
reach quite similar conclusions. When we compare the average (F-test) and the median (χ2-test) of 
the different fund styles, we can the null hypothesis that they are equal (last two columns of Table 
2). In particular, note that the funds which (risk-adjusted) perform better are the Event Driven 
ones, and those which (risk-adjusted) perform worse are the Dedicated Short Bias ones. 
In summary, our stress testing of the Hedge Funds in our sample reveals that many have 
great difficulty in fully controlling risk. And in making this statement, we stress that we engaged 
in a wide variety of tests about risk that are sophisticated to take account of the complexity of this 
industry. In our network analysis that follows, we preserve this level of sophistication, 
maintaining an awareness of the multi-dimensional nature of testing and controlling for the style 
of the fund in order to avoid any chance of finding spurious relationships between our variables of 
interest.  
 
Risk and Performance 
Correlation matrix of variables 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of the variables used in the multivariate analysis; that has 
three parts. The top left hand corner deals with performance measures; the middle part deals with 
risk measures; and the bottom section deals with the network-centrality measures.  
Insert Table 3 near here 
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When we look at the correlations between the performance measures, we detect strong and 
statistically positive correlations at the 1% level between the absolute returns, and the Sharpe and 
Sortino ratios that are risk adjusted return measures. These high correlations as expected (see for 
instance Eling and Schuhmacher, 2007), and we discuss our stress testing for other measures 
further on.  
Regarding risk measures, as might be expected in view of our previous comments, the first 
three variables used to measure idiosyncratic risk (standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis) are 
positively correlated, at least at the one percent level. If we add considerations of systematic risk, 
we see that funds that are risky - in terms of their neutrality to market risk (1-p-value high) - show 
low volatility, high skewness and high kurtosis, while funds with high systematic risk, that is 1-p-
value high, tend to present asymmetric positive (positive skewness) fat tails (positive kurtosis). 
The reverse is true when we look at the definition of neutrality on the downside. This result 
introduces the evidence that the correlation between the two measures of neutrality (1-p-value and 
p-value of neutrality) is negative and equal to minus 0.23 (statistically significant at at least the 1 
percent level): it seems that avoiding market risk is very different from avoiding market risk on 
the downside.  
The four measures of network-centrality are also highly correlated. For computational 
reasons, we divide the closeness and eigenvalue variables into “deciles” that make easy 
interpretation of the results: and note that closeness and eigenvalue are very closely correlated 
(0.79) which is as expected because they both place strong weights on distant connections. The 
betweennees and degree variables put strong weight on local connections and so they have a 
limited range and a distribution that is highly skewed, because most Hedge Funds have only one 
direct connection to a node of other Hedge Funds through its prime brokers. So for computational 
reasons, like others before us, we restrict these to take on integer values: in our case the 
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betweenness variable takes on the integer values of 1 to 4; and betweenness is either zero or one. 
These measures are also very closely correlated (0.89), and we discuss our robustness checks to 
these restrictions later.    
Network Effects on Performance  
This section discusses our results on the effects of the network variables on Hedge Funds’ 
performance (Table 4), and on their risk taking behavior (Table 5 and 6 ) using the full 
multivariate analysis. 
Table 4 shows that, controlling for other variables, network centrality has a negative effect 
on Hedge Funds’ returns measured in the crudest manner - as the ‘early mean’ of each fund. We 
used separate models to assess the effect of each measure of centrality separately to avoid the 
correlation problems that usually occur among centrality measures. The results that use the 
Eigenvalue or Degree measures show significant and negative effect on Hedge Funds’ returns 
(respectively p<0.01, p<0.05), strongly suggesting that using or being connected to many Prime 
Brokers is not beneficial for the Hedge Funds’ returns. The reader is reminded that the Eigenvalue 
places strong weight on distant connections whereas Degree places strong weight on local 
connections. The results for the control variables are as expected: younger (ln(Age)) Hedge Funds 
display negative and significant performance (p<0.01) and bigger Hedge Funds (ln(size)) positive 
and significant performance (p<0.01). We stress that we do not place undue emphasis on these 
results, as the measure of returns is quite crude. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
When we look at the effect of Hedge Funds centrality on their risk-adjusted performance, 
we see strong effects for both the Sharpe Ratio (Model 5,6,7 and 8) and the Sortino Ratio (Model 
9, 10, 11, and 12): the impact of centrality on Hedge Funds risk-adjusted performance is strongly 
and significantly negative using three of the four network metrics at the 5% levels (and some are 
also significant at the 1% level). In particular, Degree and Betweenness (measures of local 
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connectivity) are important (negative) moderators of performance (see models 7, 8, 11, and 12). 
The models also show strong results for the Eigenvalue measures of centrality (significant and 
negative) – a measure that captures both distant and local connections. In all cases, our control 
variables have expected signs: younger (Ln(age) negative and significant, p<.01) and bigger 
(Ln(Size) positive and significant, p<.01) Hedge Funds have better risk-adjusted performance.   
Taking the results together we see strong support for the notion that networks bring a dark 
side to performance: Hedge Funds that are more central to the network of Prime Brokers along 
two of the possible dimensions show consistently inferior returns. And it should be emphasized 
that we do not need all the centrality measures to be significant for the results to hold, for as 
Figure 3 shows, different measures measure different kinds of centrality.  
The size of the effects is quite large. Taking the eigenvalue effect first, we can see that 
moving 10% closer to the centre reduces the absolute return by 2% (0.25 a year on a typical long-
short equity hedge fund return of 11.2%); and the Sharpe ratio by 2.9% (0.008 on an average of 
0.276 for the same fund) and the Sortino by 0.014 (on an average of 0.000). These are large 
effects. And if we take the measure of degree, we can see that for the typical long-short equity 
hedge fund connecting to another set of funds via an extra prime broker depresses the Sharpe ratio 
from 0.276 to 0.250 (9.41%), and the Sortino ratio from 0.00 to -0.06 – both very significant 
changes.12  
 
Network Effects on Risk Taking 
                                                        
The Long-Short Equity hedge is the most frequently observed investment style of hedge fund, 
with a typical fund size of about $58.8 million, and average age (5 years). Using our data we can 
see that this typical fund has a Sharpe ratio of 0.276, with just one Prime Broker connecting to an 
average of 120 funds, and it is forecasted to move to a Sharpe ratio of 0.25 for an additional  
Prime Broker. For example referring to the first computation, and following the rank of Model 4 
of Table 5 figures are as follow for one Prime Broker 0.276 = ‐0.026 [1] ‐ 0.06 [ln(5)] + 0.02 
[ln(58791039)] + 0.40 [1] – 0.36 [1] and for two Prime Broker 0.250 = ‐0.026 [2] ‐ 0.06 [ln(5)] + 
0.02 [ln(58791039)] + 0.40 [1] – 0.36 [1] 
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But what of risk taking behavior: is inferior performance correlated with taking fewer risks – or of 
taking more? Table 5 sheds light on this (very) relevant issue by showing the regression 
coefficient of logit models where the endogenous variable is a compound indicator that accounts 
for both skewness and kurtosis. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 
one when the fund’s return presents both negative skewness and positive kurtosis – that is when 
the returns can be considered risky - and zero otherwise. Model 3 and 4 show that the more central 
Hedge Funds are, the more risks they take (Betweenness and Degree significant and positive, at 
p<.05 and p<.01 respectively). These results lend further support to the view that Networks can 
have a dark-side: centrality seems to increases risk-taking behavior as well as diminishing 
performance.  
The control variable size is not significant, but the age variable suggests that older Hedge 
Funds take more risks (age positive and significant at 1% level). Patton (2009) suggests that this 
last result about the effect of age might be the result of a ‘drift’ in fund style. 
Insert Table 6 about here – 
We interpret the size of the effect as follows. Again, using the regression logit regression 
coefficients of model (4) in Table 6, and applying them to the median fund in line with the 
methodology previous discussed gives a change in the likelihood of having both left and fat tails 
from 45.3% for the typical fund using one prime broker to connect with typically 70 funds to 
53.7% for adding another prime broker making an additional set of connections to other Hedge 
Funds. That is a change of 18% in the likelihood percentage.  
To continue our tests of risk-taking behavior, we utilize the more sophisticated measures 
of risk-taking related to ‘market risk exposure’. By this measure, both the eigenvalue and the 
closeness measures are positive and significant. Interpreting the results we see that moving 10% 
closer to the centre changes the probability of market risk exposure by 1%.  We note that this 
measure is likely to be the one accepted by institutional investors that have a market based 
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portfolio.  
Finally, in line with Patton (2009) we look at ‘market risk exposure on the downside’- as 
noted before, this is a demanding criterion, and not necessarily correlated with other measures of 
risk taking. Table 6 presents the results of the eigenvector and closeness centrality metrics (which 
measure both direct and indirect ties, from different perspectives) confirm our finding that 
centrality is highly correlated with risk taking, with closeness being consistently significant across 
both. Again, it seems that moving 10% closer to the centre increases the probability of market risk 
exposure by 1%. 
We noted earlier that Market Risk exposure is negatively correlated with Market Risk 
Exposure on the Downside, so it is surprising but pleasing to see that centrality measured by 
closeness still plays a role with the latter measure. And again, we see that moving 10% closer to 
the centre of the network increases the change of the fund taking risks on the downside by 1%. As 
explained below, both sets of results  seem to support the theorizing that the forces that increase 
risk-taking are related to the eigenvector and closeness measures of centrality - power and hubris - 
rather different from the argument about the factors that depress returns - the costs of information 
overload. It is likely that there are multiple factors at work in the network, and that high costs and 
information overload act together with a sense of power and hubris to yield these results.  
 
4. Discussion & Conclusion 
Taking a significant section of the Hedge Fund industry as our sample, we have mapped the 
network that existed between Hedge Funds and Prime Brokers in 2006, when industry conditions 
were relatively benign. Controlling for several determinants of hedge-fund performance - such us 
fund age, size, strategy and prime broker(s) - we find that an increase in network centrality has a 
negative effect on performance and a positive effect on risk-taking (where these were measured in 
a five year window). These results are robust across many metrics of performance, especially the 
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commonly reported absolute returns, Sharpe and Sortino metrics, as well as various measures of 
risk including skewness and kurtosis, risk of co-movements with market indicators, as well as risk 
on the downside. The magnitude of all these effects was shown to be significant 
Our paper makes several contributions. First, it advances the value of including network 
variables in finance studies in general and in the study of Hedge Funds in particular. Until now, 
most of work on the structure of the Hedge Fund industry has focused on the personal background 
of the managers (see for instance: Haitao Li , Rui Zhao and Xiaoyan Zhang (2008); or Maxam, C. 
L., Nikbakht, E., Petrova, M., Spieler, A C. (2006) ): few authors have looked at the institutional 
arrangements that permit Hedge Funds to connect with each other. Our approach shows the value 
of factoring network variables - largely disregarded in previous Hedge Funds performance models 
- into the performance equation. In this respect, our findings answer the calls to integrate 
sociological theory more fully into finance made by such as Abolafia (1997) and Mizruchi and 
Stearns (1994). And the results are practical, showing that understanding these connections may 
be important for investors choosing which hedge fund to invest in, as highly central funds not only 
appear to perform worse but also to take more risks.  
Second, we believe our paper is the first to connect risk-taking to networks. Until recently, 
most of the literature in finance (and indeed in management) has stressed the positive influence of 
network relationships on performance, and has avoided explicitly discussing risk and risk-taking. 
We fill this important gap, by trying to unpick more fully what drives risk-taking behavior. This 
study advances knowledge about the ‘dark side’ of networks (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000), 
suggesting that there are downsides to broadening one’s network position (at least, if one is a 
Hedge Fund). These findings should add a note of caution to those studies that overly emphasize 
the informational properties of networks: networks have costs as well as benefits, and it is by no 
means a given that one side will always outweigh the other.   
Our findings about risk taking are especially intriguing. First, the strongest network 
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correlations of risk-taking (when measured with respect to market co-movements) in our study are 
global centrality metrics that measure both direct and indirect Hedge Funds connections. In 
network theory, such global measures are often associated with an actor’s perception of ‘being in 
the midst of the action’: intuitively correlated with the sense of power. If our speculation is 
correct, it would seem that risk-taking is more often an irrational than rational decision - one 
driven by hubris and the power effects, rather than just simply by costs. Second, if we map our 
finding on risk-taking onto the finance literature’s traditional view about risk-taking being driven 
by the divergence between principals and agents, we see some similarities. The usual argument 
about hedge fund managers taking risks links the possibility of opportunism to the hedge fund 
managers’ contracts which, with their typically large payments for superior performance, work 
like a call option in rewarding risk-taking at the possible expense of wealth creation for the 
investor, a problem that even the inclusion of ‘high water marks’ does not entirely remove (e.g. 
Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross 2003). However, proponents of such contracts argue that the 
managers’ ability to ‘cheat’ – by engaging in opportunistic behavior - is limited by the attendant 
loss of status and reputation (see for instance the arguments of Roberts and Dowling, 2002, 
applied in another context). Our insight adds another layer of argument: that being centrally 
located in their networks (as measured by both direct and indirect ties) may encourage actors to 
believe the penalty for taking ‘excessive’ risks will be lessened, or can even give them a sense of 
‘immunity’ from punishment. And this may have some reality - network ties can not only create a 
sense of power in ‘central’ actors - they can also create a sense of obligation from other actors that 
does indeed make the central player impervious to the adverse consequences of external events 
(Pffeffer and Salanik, 1978; Anderson and Galinsky, 2006). The other (less central) actors may 
conspire to cover up cheating and provide resources to assist centrally-placed cheaters to re-
establish themselves. Where such tie-dependency exists, the central player can engage in repeated 
opportunistic behavior that would be caught out in a normal market with good information 
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mechanisms. Put bluntly, a hedge fund manager who is central in their network may be able to 
exploit that position to take unjustified risks, creaming profits from the ‘upside’ (as agent) and 
leaving the investor (the principal) holding the risks, and do so repeatedly, and without being 
punished. Our opening story hinted at this possibility, but to test these ideas scientifically would 
require a new approach - possibly involving identifying actors that are central in their sets of 
direct and indirect connections, and seeing if their behaviors are consistent with our speculation.  
Finally, it is worth restating that our work is an attempt to build bridges between the work 
of finance scholars and those involved in strategy and organization theory. There is a long history 
of work by sociologists on the nature of financial markets - important in this respect is the 
contribution of Baker (1984) on the behavior of traders in the Chicago exchange markets, which 
documented the dynamics of actors’ behaviors, and how they were influenced by changes in 
markets and in turn how this influenced the efficiency of trading. We also recognize the work of 
Buenza and Stark (2004) and Buenza, Hardie and MacKenzie (2006); they looked at how 
arbitrage actually works, and why prices sometimes do not converge in markets. Both these 
studies have inspired our social network perspective of risk and performance in the hedge fund 
industry. We believe these kinds of approaches are important to guide the development of new 
theories that can help us understand such events as the recent financial crisis, as well as to design 
new regulations that can better meet the challenges of an increasingly networked world.  
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Figure 2 - Centrality effects on Portfolio Risk-Return  
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Figure 3 - Graphical Illustration of Network Measures of Degree, Closeness, 
Betwenness and Eigenvalue using Krackhardt’s Kite network example  
Node 7 has the highest
Degree centrality because
it has the greatest number
of direct connection.
But it has connections
only to others in its
immediate cluster – its
clique. It connects only
those who are already
connected to each other.
Node 7 also has the
highest eigenvalue,
because it has the highest
number of direct and
indirect connections.
Node 8 has few direct connections but it has one
of the best locations in the network. It is between two
important constituencies. It plays a 'broker' role in the
network which means a powerful role in the network,
but also a point of failure. Without it, 9 and 10 would
be cut off from information in 7's cluster.
A node with high betweenness has great influence
over what flows -- and does not -- in the network. A
node like 8 holds a lot power over the outcomes in a
network.
Nodes 4 and 5 have fewer connections than 7, yet
the pattern of their direct and indirect ties allow them
to access all the nodes in the network more quickly
than anyone else. They have the shortest paths to all
others, they are close to everyone else. They are in an
excellent position to monitor the information flow in
the network, they have the best visibility into what is
happening in the network
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Table 1 – Summary statistics of Funds included in the sample and the MSCI World 
Market Index used as benchmark 
This table reports the median of the descriptive statistics on monthly hedge funds returns across all 
funds included in the sample with at least twelve observations. Using the same methodology, the 
column headed “MSCI World Index” reports same statistics but referring to the MSCI World market 
index used as benchmark computed only if the referred fund was reported. The “Shapiro‐Wilk” refers 
to the Shapiro‐Wilk test of normality. The p‐value for this test is also reported. 
Median Hedge 
Fund
Median MSCI 
World Index
Mean 0.008014 0.008871
Standard Deviation 0.020713 0.03282
Skewness -0.072590 -0.90596
Kurtosis 3.302066 4.764936
Min -0.041000 -0.11794
Max 0.056404 0.08286
Number of obs 56 56
Shapiro-Wilk 
normality test 0.661 2.183
Shapiro-Wilk p-value 0.254 0.015
Sharpe ratio 0 .222415
Sortino ratio 0 .357724
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Table 2 – Summary statistics of risk and performance of funds split by investment style category 
This table reports the median statistics using the monthly funds returns over the sample period split by investment style. Funds included are those with at least twelve observations. Shapiro-Wilk and the below p-value 
refer to the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality and the relative p-value, respectively. ρ(ri;rMSCI) refers to the median linear correlation between funds and the MSCI World Market Index. β1 and β2are the coefficients of the 
following regressions rhf = α + β1rMSCI  + β2 rMSCI2+ ε. Neutrality test (Wald test) is used to test whether β1 and β2 are conjointly equal zero. Consequently, a p-value under 10 percent indicates that the market risk affects 
the fund performance. % of neutrality indicates the percentage of funds which reject the null hypothesis of neutrality. γ1,neg, γ2,neg, γ1,pos, and γ2,pos, are the coefficients of the following regressions ri = α + γ1,negrMSCIδ+ 
γ2,negrMSCI2 δ + γ1,posrMSCI(1-δ) + γ2,posrMSCI2 (1-δ) + ε where δ is one whether the rMSCI is less than zero and zero otherwise. Like Patton (2009), the neutrality test of the Downside (Wald test) tests whether the first 
derivative γ1,neg+ 2 γ2,negis higher than 0. A p-value below 10 percent rejects the hypothesis of market risk exposure for a risk-adverse investor. Sharpe ratio, Sortino ratio, and Omega ratio indicate the three risk-adjusted 
fund performance measures used in this study. 
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F‐test χ2‐test 
Mean  0.0064 ‐0.0028 0.0127 0.0054 0.0100 0.0075  0.0066 0.0060 0.0093 0.0076 0.0085 25.10 313.31 
Standard Deviation  0.0147 0.0363 0.0270 0.0143 0.0152 0.0125  0.0134 0.0243 0.0262 0.0462 0.0129 54.76 664.75 
Skewness  ‐0.1276 0.2883 ‐0.0437 0.0500 0.0168 ‐0.1230  ‐0.3469 0.2236 ‐0.0541 0.1296 ‐0.0356 8.00 162.52 
Kurtosis  3.5893 2.8119 3.2002 3.2679 4.0384 3.7021  3.0683 3.3406 3.3469 2.8743 3.5478 8.49 122.81 
Min  ‐0.0290 ‐0.0812 ‐0.0488 ‐0.0296 ‐0.0272 ‐0.0230  ‐0.0269 ‐0.0497 ‐0.0546 ‐0.0914 ‐0.0255 39.78 503.12 
Max  0.0376 0.0851 0.0757 0.0383 0.0480 0.0337  0.0343 0.0736 0.0708 0.1174 0.0397 27.83 591.32 
Number of obs  60 60 49 52 60 43  46 42 59 60 50     
Shapiro‐Wilk normality test  1.2067 ‐0.2391 0.3296 0.5821 1.5641 0.9108  0.6691 0.7579 0.4815 0.2939 0.8811 10.57 85.37 
Shapiro‐Wilk p‐value  0.1138 0.5945 0.3709 0.2803 0.0589 0.1829  0.2517 0.2243 0.3151 0.3844 0.1891 5.16 85.37 
ρ(ri;rMSCI)  0.1899 ‐0.769 0.486 0.0757 0.4422 0.0617  0.5713 0.2308 0.4807 ‐0.0097 0.3566 99.31 611.66 
β1  0.0868 ‐0.9147 0.5116 0.0413 0.1921 0.0194  0.2767 0.2236 0.423 0.0339 0.1241 43.14 519.38 
β2  1.0366 ‐1.4220 0.9490 ‐0.1169 0.0496 0.1301  0.1335 1.8394 0.3281 4.6808 0.5756 7.81 159.58 
p‐value of neutrality test (Wald test)  0.06 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.20  0.00 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.03 21.09 386.60 
% of Non Neutrality (cutoff 10%)  0.59 1.00 0.85 0.41 0.81 0.40  0.88 0.62 0.80 0.58 0.67   
γ 1, neg  0.1506 ‐1.0031 0.1692 0.1286 0.2407 0.0131  0.1666 0.1423 0.3373 ‐0.6458 0.1717 2.25 89.26 
γ2, neg  1.5912 ‐3.8269 0.3153 1.28 0.7789 ‐0.3821  0.3013 ‐0.7876 1.2254 ‐0.6054 0.853 1.15 32.38 
γ 1, pos  ‐0.0862 ‐1.3104 0.6581 0.0558 0.3108 0.0667  0.634 0.487 0.8524 1.6314 0.2204 26.63 371.17 
γ2, pos  4.9579 10.6058 ‐5.9989 ‐0.9724 ‐2.5992 1.147  ‐5.8296 ‐3.6239 ‐7.0537 ‐18.6923 ‐0.5142 6.95 207.84 
p‐value of Non Neutrality on the Downside (Wald)  0.51 0.00 0.91 0.47 0.73 0.48  0.86 0.52 0.90 0.08 0.59 49.01 411.82 
% of Neutrality on the Downside (cutoff 10%)  0.15 0.71 0.04 0.23 0.10 0.23  0.07 0.20 0.06 0.50 0.11  
Sharpe ratio  0.1979 ‐0.1946 0.3550 0.1424 0.3893 0.2896  0.2123 0.0932 0.2171 0.0875 0.3461 24.32 369.72 
Sortino ratio  0.2821 ‐0.3499 0.5447 0.2079 0.6380 0.3999  0.3142 0.1601 0.3570 0.1638 0.5044 13.05 297.41 
     
# of funds  71 14 120 148 213 102  365 92 826 139 97   
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Table 3 – Correlation matrix of the risk and risk-performance measures 
This Table reports the pairwise correlation coefficients of the risk and risk-adjusted performance 
measured. Funds included are those with at least twelve observations. All variables are those reported in 
Table 2. All correlations are significant at 1% level  
Correlations of Performance Measures 
 
Absolute 
return  Sharpe ratio  Sortino ratio 
Absolute return 1.00 0.58  0.30
Sharpe ratio 0.58 1.00  0.59
Sortino ratio 0.30 0.59  1.00
 
Corrrelation of Risk Measures 
 
Standard 
Deviation  Skewness  Kurtosis 
1 ‐ p‐value( 
Neutrality 
Risk test) 
p‐value of 
Neutrality 
Risk on 
Downside 
test 
Standard Deviation  1.00 0.17 0.09 ‐0.07  ‐0.05
Skewness  0.17 1.00 0.17 0.12  ‐0.11
Kurtosis  0.09 0.17 1.00 0.11  ‐0.01
1 ‐ p‐value(Neutrality Risk test)  ‐0.07 0.12 0.11 1.00  ‐0.23
p‐value of Neutrality Risk on Downside test  ‐0.05 ‐0.11 ‐0.01 ‐0.23  1.00
 
Correlation of Centrality Measures 
 
 
10 quantiles 
of  
eigenvalue 
10 quantiles 
of  closeness betweenness  degree 
10 quantiles of eigenvalue 1.00 0.79 0.29  0.27
10 quantiles of closeness 0.79 1.00 0.39  0.37
betweenness 0.29 0.39 1.00  0.89
degree 0.27 0.37 0.89  1.00
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Table 4 – Hedge Funds  performance regressed against network indicators 
This Table reports coefficients of the Performance measures of each fund with at least twelve observations and the network variable indicators. Control 
variables are the natural logarithm of the life (Ln(Age)) and the net asset under management  Ln(Size) of the fund, respectively. All specifications also 
consider eleven dummies based on the investment style of the fund. Robust t-statistics in parentheses ***, **, and * denotes significance at least at the 
0.01, 0.05,0.10 percent level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Y = return of the hedge fund (yearly based) Sharpe ratio Sortino ratio 
                      
10 quantiles of 
eigenvalue 
-
0.256***    
-
0.008***     
-
0.014**     
 (-2.75)    (-3.14)     (-2.57)     
10 quantiles of closeness  -0.075     -0.003      -0.005    
  (-0.75)     (-1.35)      (-0.96)    
betweenness   -1.416*     
-
0.053**      
-
0.118***   
   (-1.77)     (-2.47)      (-2.81)   
nbroker_degree    -1.025**     
-
0.026**     
-
0.065*** 
    (-2.58)     (-2.07)     (-2.88) 
ln(age) 
-
1.426*** 
-
1.387*** 
-
1.360*** 
-
1.370*** -0.07*** 
-
0.06*** 
-
0.06*** 
-
0.06*** 
-
0.14*** 
-
0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 (-3.45) (-3.39) (-3.27) (-3.29) (-5.09) (-4.98) (-4.87) (-4.89) (-4.81) (-4.71) (-4.60) (-4.62) 
ln(size) 0.870*** 0.823*** 0.819*** 0.823*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (4.69) (4.46) (4.20) (4.22) (7.21) (6.63) (6.76) (6.72) (6.31) (5.74) (5.97) (5.95) 
Constant -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.37*** 
-
0.37*** 
-
0.39*** 
-
0.36*** 
-
0.68*** 
-
0.68*** -0.71*** -0.64*** 
 (-3.41) (-3.41) (-3.50) (-3.31) (-4.29) (-4.28) (-4.41) (-4.10) (-4.12) (-4.13) (-4.24) (-3.87) 
DUMMY STRATEGY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 
R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 
Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
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Table 5 – Hedge Funds risk taking behaviour regressed against network indicators (Logit model) 
This Table reports coefficients of Logit models where the dependent variable is one whether the fund present both 
negative skewness and positive kurtosis and zero otherwise. Control variables are the natural logarithm of the life 
(Ln(Age)) and the net asset under management Ln(Size) of the fund, respectively. All specifications also consider 
eleven dummies based on the investment style of the fund. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes 
significance at least at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent level, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  Y = (0/1; 1 if negative skewness combined with positive kurtosis) 
            
eigenvalue (10 deciles)  -0.016    
  (-0.65)    
closeness (10 deciles)   -0.003   
   (-0.12)   
Dummy positive betweenness    0.451**  
    (2.12)  
nbroker (degree)     0.335*** 
     (2.66) 
ln(age)  0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
  (2.78) (2.81) (2.82) (2.87) 
ln(size)  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  (0.59) (0.50) (0.28) (0.23) 
Constant  -2.61*** -1.18* -1.17* -1.47** 
  (-2.74) (-1.83) (-1.80) (-2.25) 
DUMMY STRATEGY  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  2116 2116 2116 2116 
Pseudo R-squared  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
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Table 6 – Hedge Funds market risk exposure taking behaviour regressed against network indicators 
This Table reports coefficients of the regression where the dependent variables are the Neutrality risk exposure (Model 1, 2, 3, and 4) and neutrality risk on 
the downside exposure (5, 6, 7, and 8) of each fund with at least twelve observations. The first dependent is computed firstly regressing ri,t = α + β1rMSCI  + β2 
rMSCI2+ ε and then computing the neutrality test (Wald test) to test whether β1 and β2 are conjointly equal zero. Finally, we consider 1- p-value of the test as a 
proxy for the neutrality risk exposure of the fund to the market risk.  The second dependent is computed firstly regressing ri = α + γ1,negrMSCIδ+ γ2,neg rMSCI2 δ + 
γ1,posrMSCI(1-δ) + γ2,pos rMSCI2 (1-δ) + ε where δ is one whether the rMSCI is less than zero and zero otherwise. Then, we test the neutrality on the Downside 
(Wald test) computing the first derivative γ1,neg+ 2 γ2,negconditionally to negative return of the market index and then test that is higher than 0. A p-value 
below 10 percent rejects the hypothesis of market risk exposure for a risk-adverse investor. Control variables are the natural logarithm of the life (Ln(Age)) 
and the net asset under management Ln(Size) of the fund, respectively. All specifications also consider eleven dummies based on the investment style of the 
fund. Robust t-statistics in parentheses ***, **, and * denotes significance at least at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Y = Market risk exposure Y = Market risk exposure on the downside 
         
eigenvalue (10 deciles) 0.01***    0.01*    
 (3.23)    (1.68)    
closeness (10 deciles)  0.01***    0.01**   
  (2.97)    (1.99)   
Dummy positive betweenness   0.01    0.03  
   (0.31)    (0.78)  
nbroker (degree)    0.00    0.03 
    (0.22)    (1.10) 
ln(age) 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 (4.53) (4.38) (4.59) (4.39) (3.51) (3.60) (3.47) (4.46) 
ln(size) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.83) (0.79) (1.20) (1.04) (1.33) (1.23) (1.64) (1.25) 
Constant 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.03 
 (0.16) (0.10) (0.30) (0.30) (-1.15) (-1.21) (-1.14) (-0.29) 
DUMMY STRATEGY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 2116 
R-squared 0.107 0.106 0.100 0.102 0.262 0.262 0.260 0.245 
Adj. R-squared 0.0977 0.0970 0.0906 0.0939 0.254 0.255 0.253 0.238 
 
